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Contraction in Major League Baseball: Do
Owners Have a Duty To Bargain in Good
Faith with the Union Before Shutting Down
or Relocating a Team?
J. Benjamin Staherski*
I.

Introduction

The future of the Minnesota Twins and the Montreal Expos was in
question at the start of the 2002 Major League Baseball ("MLB") season.
MLB owners considered shutting down the Montreal Expos and
Minnesota Twins, a process called contraction, and possibly relocating
the teams to another city. 1 The Expos and the Twins were the subject of
contraction because they had trouble generating sufficient revenue. 2 The
Montreal Expos suffered low attendance rates and generated little
revenue from television and radio contracts.3 Although they had
to generate
sufficient attendance, the Minnesota Twins failed
4
government support for a much-needed new stadium.
Both the Expos and the Twins, however, were benefiting from the
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2004; B.S., 2001, The Pennsylvania State University.
1. Twins, Expos Say No in 28-2 Vote To Contract Two Teams, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Nov. 6, 2001, availableat
http://cbs.sportsline.com/u/ce/multi/0,1329,448654252,00.html. The MLB owners voted
to "contract" two teams from MLB, which would drop the total number of teams from
thirty to twenty-eight. There were also talks of possibly relocating one of the teams to
the Washington, D.C./Northern Virginia area).
2. Id. Major League Baseball Commissioner Bud Selig stated: "The teams to be
contracted have a long record of failing to generate enough revenues to operate a viable
major-league franchise." Id.
3. Id. "The Expos averaged just 7,648 fans per game at Olympic Stadium this year
and have locally generated revenue of about $16 million-8 percent of the Yankees' total
of nearly $200 million." Id.
4. Id. "Minnesota and Florida have failed to generate government support of new
ballparks, and Twins owner Carl Pohlad has pushed Selig to eliminate his team in
exchange for a large contraction payment, according to other owners, who spoke on
condition they would not be identified." Id.
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revenue sharing among the MLB teams. The high-revenue teams were
frustrated with having to continue subsidizing the low-revenue teams.5
To date, this attitude remains the same, particularly after the owner of the
Minnesota Twins kept much of this revenue sharing money instead of
reinvesting it for the betterment of the team.6
The decision to contract a team was not initiated by a few teams;
rather, "[C]ontraction was an initiative of the 30 clubs and continues to
be wholly supported by that group." 7 The decision to contract and/or
relocate MLB teams was led by MLB Commissioner Bud Selig. 8 Selig
vowed to press on, suggesting that the elimination of teams was
necessary in order to stop industry losses, which he claims totaled
hundreds of millions of dollars in 2002.9
This proposed contraction and/or relocation by the owners created
conflict between the owners and the players' union, which is called the
Major League Baseball Players Association ("MLBPA"). The owners
felt that, like other organizations and businesses, they should be able to
shut down an unprofitable plant, or in this case a team, without having to
10
bargain with the union.
The MLBPA felt, however, that if the owners were not only
shutting down a team, but also relocating it, the owners should have to
bargain with the MLBPA before doing so.1" The MLBPA also argued
that even if an owner is not required to bargain with the MLBPA under
traditional rules of bargaining, there should be an exception due to the
unique situation in MLB. Because MLB has historically been treated
differently than other business entities due to MLB's antitrust exemption,
5. Id.(stating that "the high-revenue teams don't want to give up any more money
to revenue sharing.").
6. Doug Pappas, The Numbers (PartSix): Profits and Revenue Sharing (2002), at
http://roadsidephotos.com/baseballU. "[I]n 2000 the Minnesota Twins received $21

million from the revenue-sharing pool, $5 million more than the salaries paid to their
entire 25-man roster." Id. This was one of the reasons why the MLB owners were
considering to contract the Minnesota Twins. See id.
7. Selig Says Baseball Will Try Again in 2003, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 13, 2002,
available at http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/2002/0205/1323166.html (Bud Selig stated:
"The clubs recognize that our current economic circumstance makes contraction
absolutely inevitable, as certain franchises simply cannot compete and cannot generate
enough revenues to survive. Quite a few of our clubs advocate contraction by as many as
four clubs.")
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id (Union Head Donald Fehr said: "We are pleased that the 2002 season will
proceed with 30 teams ....However, it is regrettable that the clubs continue to assert
that they can and will act unilaterally, rather than by negotiation and agreement.").
11. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994) (requiring an employer to "meet at reasonable times
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment" with the union).
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and because of the profit and revenue sharing that occurs amongst the
to bargain
teams, the MLBPA argued that the owners should be required
2
in good faith before contracting and/or relocating a team.1
The issue of whether or not a MLB owner has a duty to bargain with
the MLBPA before contracting and/or relocating a team went before an
arbitrator but was never resolved because the owners decided not to
contract or relocate either team.' 3 If this issue would arise again, would a
MLB team owner be required to bargain with the union in good faith
before deciding to contract or relocate their team?
This Comment addresses whether MLB owners have a duty to
bargain in good faith before contracting and/or relocating a team. Part II
of the Comment explains the current statutory law of bargaining.' 4 Part
III analyzes the Collective Bargaining Agreement in MLB. Part IV
addresses whether closing and/or relocating a business is a mandatory
subject of bargaining under 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). Part V discusses how
the rules of bargaining should be applied to MLB in contracting or
relocating teams. Part VI addresses the antitrust exemption in MLB and
the other ways MLB is, or should be, treated uniquely. Part VII
concludes that MLB owners do not have a duty to bargain in good faith
before contracting or relocating a team.
II.

Current Law of Bargaining

Title 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) governs an employer's duty to bargain in
good faith with a union over mandatory subjects of bargaining.' 5 An
employer and the representative of the employees must "meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment.' 16 "[W]ages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment" are considered to be
mandatory subjects of bargaining.' 7 Any decision that is not considered
a mandatory subject of bargaining can be unilaterally implemented by
the employer.
When a mandatory subject of bargaining is contained in an
employee's contract, it is treated differently than if it were left out of the
contract. If a mandatory subject of bargaining is not contained in the

12. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (upholding, for the third time in fifty years,
the antitrust exemption as it applies to MLB).
13. Telephone Interview with Doyle Pryor, Counsel for MLBPA (Sept. 19, 2002).
The author is grateful to Doyle Pryor for suggesting this topic, which was a major issue
of debate during arbitration that was never resolved.
14. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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contract, an employer must bargain in good faith with the union
representatives to impasse. 18 Once bargaining reaches impasse, then
"[the] employer may unilaterally implement its bargaining proposal with
respect to the matter not contained in the agreement."' 9 "Where a
mandatory subject is contained in the
contract, however, [§ 158(d)]
20
actions.,
employer's
an
limits
further
III.

Collective Bargaining Agreement in MLB

On December 7, 1996, a Collective Bargaining Agreement was
created between the Clubs comprising the National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs and the Clubs compromising the American
League of Professional Baseball Clubs ("Clubs") and the MLBPA. 21 The
Collective Bargaining Agreement went into effect on January 1, 1997
and was to last through 2001.22 The Collective Bargaining Agreement
covered such employment issues as negotiation and approval of
contracts, salaries, profit sharing, discipline, and arbitration, among
others, but did not include the possibility of a contraction or relocation
decision. 23 Because the issue of an owner's duty to bargain over the
decision to contract or relocate a MLB team is not included in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, it must be determined if the decision
is a mandatory subject of bargaining.
IV. Is the Decision To Close or Relocate a Business a Mandatory
Subject of Bargaining?
A.

Closures

Courts have held that a duty to bargain in good faith does not apply
to owners who decide to close a business.24 The Court in Textile
Workers Union of America v. DarlingtonManufacturing Co. held that an
employer had the absolute right to terminate his entire business for any

18. Int'l Union v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 755 (7th ed. 1999) (defining impasse as "a point in labor negotiations at
which agreement cannot be reached").
19. Int'l Union, 765 F.2d at 179.
20. Id. (It is well understood that § 158(d) prohibits an employer from altering
contractual terms concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining during the life of a
collective bargaining agreement without the consent of the union).
21. AM. LEAGUE OF PROF'L BASEBALL CLUBS, NAT'L LEAGUE OF PROF'L BASEBALL
CLUBS, & MAJOR LEAGUE
AGREEMENT (Jan. 1, 1997).

22.
23.
24.

BASEBALL

PLAYERS

ASS'N,

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Id.
Id.
See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
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reason he pleased.
Courts have also held that an employer does not
have a duty to bargain in good faith over closings because decisions that
change the direction of an enterprise,26 or that involve major shifts in the
capital investment or corporate strategy of a company,2 7 do not fit under
management decisions involving terms and conditions of employment.2 8
The decision to close a business is not a mandatory subject of bargaining;
an owner thus does not have a duty to bargain with a union before
closing his business. The courts have looked at the decision to close and
relocate a business in a different way from the decision just to close a
business.
B.

Relocation

If an owner of a MLB team were to contract their team, the owner
should not have to bargain with the MLBPA before doing so. However,
would an owner who was planning on contracting the team and
relocating it to a new city have a duty to bargain with the MLBPA? The
owners of the Montreal Expos and the Minnesota Twins contemplated
this exact situation. It was rumored that the owners of these teams were
considering moving their teams to the Washington, D.C./Northern
Virginia region. 29
Two leading Supreme Court cases analyzed the question of
mandatory bargaining in an owner's decision to subcontract work 3° and
an owner's decision to partially close his business. 3 1
In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, an employer
subcontracted work to cut labor costs in his business.32 The Fibreboard
25. Id. (holding that when an employer closes his entire business, even if the
liquidation is motivated by vindictiveness toward the union, such action is not an unfair
labor practice).
26. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 209-10 (1964)
("Management decisions that fundamentally alter the direction of an enterprise, or
involve significant reallocation of capital generally are not considered decisions
concerning terms and conditions of employment and are not mandatory subjects of
bargaining.").
27. Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 884 (U.S.
App. 1978) ("Major shifts in the capital investment or corporate strategy of a company
are not mandatory bargaining subjects, even though they may have a profound effect on
the conditions of employment.").
28. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994) (Courts attempt to define the ambiguous wording
"terms and conditions of employment" in the statute).
29.

Twins, Expos Say No in 28-2 Vote To Contract Two Teams, ASSOCIATED PRESS,

Nov. 6, 2001, available at
http://cbs.sportsline.com/u/ce/multi/0,1329,4486542_52,00.html ("Washington-Northern
Virginia has been the most aggressive area in pursuing a team.")
30. See Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
31. See First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
32. Fibreboard,379 U.S. at 206.
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Court held that the decision by the employer to subcontract work was a
violation of § 8(d).33 The Court said that the relocation decision was a
violation of § 8(d) because the decision turned on the issue of labor costs,
an issue that is typically a mandatory subject of bargaining. 34 The Court
held that the decision to subcontract work violated § 8(d) because it did
not change the company's basic operation and was merely done to
replace existing employees.35
More recently, the Supreme Court looked at the issue of an
employer's duty to bargain over a partial closing of a business. 36 In First
National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, the Court held that an employer
did not have a duty to bargain with the union before shutting down a part
of the business. 37 The Supreme Court's holding in First National was
limited to allow employers to make unilateral decisions so long as the
burden placed on the conduct of the business outweighs the benefit for
labor-management relations and the collective-bargaining process. 38 The
Court also allowed an employer to make decisions without bargaining
with the union in instances where the union has no control or authority39to
change the employer's decision, even if bargaining were to take place.
The NLRB used the Supreme Court's analysis in Fibreboardand
First National to determine that an owner did not need to bargain with
the union over a relocation decision.40 In Otis Elevator Co., the NLRB
looked at the decision to relocate's impact on the employees. 4' The
NLRB asked whether the owner's decision to relocate turned on the issue

33. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) was previously § 8(d).
34. Fibreboard,379 U.S. at 213.
35. Id. (The decision to subcontract work "did not alter the Company's basic
operation. The maintenance work still had to be performed at the plant. No capital
investment was contemplated; the Company merely replaced existing employees with
those of an independent contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of
employment").
36. See First Nat'l, 452 U.S. at 666 (The issue of a duty to bargain over a partial
closing is evaluated in the same fashion as a duty to bargain over a relocation).
37. Id. at 686 (Employer of a housekeeping service, for commercial customers,
stopped providing services to a nursing home due to a loss of money on the contract).
38. Id. ("The publicity incident to the normal process of bargaining may injure the
possibility of a successful transition or increase the economic damage to the business.
The employer also may have no feasible alternative to the closing, and even good-faith
bargaining over it may both be futile and cause the employer additional loss.").
39. Id. (The employer had no duty to bargain because the union had no control or
authority over the fee that the employer was willing to pay to continue housekeeping
services at the nursing home).
40. Otis Elevator Co., 1984 NLRB LEXIS 866, at *1 (1984) (owner was not
required to bargain with union over discontinuing research and development at
Parsippany and Mahwah facilities and consolidating them at their East Hartford,
Connecticut facility).
41. Id. at *8.
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of labor CoStS. 42 If a decision to relocate turned on the issue of labor
costs, then the decision would be a mandatory subject of bargaining.43
The NLRB decided that the relocation decision did not turn on the issue
of labor costs, but rather the decision was made due to the outdated
technology at the research and development facility. 44

Because the

decision did not turn on the issue of labor costs, the employer had no
duty to bargain with the union before relocating.45
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals evaluated the decision to
relocate in a similar fashion.46 In Dorsey Trailers v. NLRB, the company
and the owners could not successfully negotiate the terms of a new
collective bargaining agreement.4 7 Due to the increase in demand for
new trailers and the union's decision to go on strike, the company
relocated its business from Northumberland, Pennsylvania to
Cartersville, Georgia. 8 The court held that the company did not have a
duty to bargain with the union over its relocation decision even though it
influenced the "tenure" of employment. 49 The court called this decision
"fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise" 5 and "not
a term or condition of employment;" therefore, there was no obligation
for the company to bargain with the union until impasse.5'
In all of the cases dealing with relocation decisions, the court's duty
was to determine if the employers failed to bargain with the unions over
"terms and conditions of employment." 52 The courts used the reasoning

42. Id. (The NLRB realized that labor costs "may have been one of the factors which
stimulated the evaluation process which generated the decision").
43. See Fibreboard,379 U.S. at 203.
44. Otis Elevator Co., 1984 NLRB LEXIS, at *1.
45. Id. at *2.
46. Dorsey Trailers, Inc. v. NLRB, 233 F.3d 831 (4th Cir. 2000) (Here, the court
also looked at Fibreboardand FirstNational in evaluating whether the owner's decision
to relocate was a mandatory subject of bargaining).
47. Id. at 836 ("The company wanted the ability to subcontract work and to mandate
overtime" in order "to meet the increasing demand for its trailers." The union, however,
"asked for wage increases while opposing the subcontracting and mandatory overtime
provisions").
48. Id. at 836-37 ("On June 26, 1995, the strike began. In response, the company
began to look at other options to fill the work orders that were backlogged due to the
strike. On September 25, the company investigated purchasing a new facility in
Cartersville, Georgia." The company relocated the business due to the more effective
assembly line structure and due to the geographical location, which would "substantially
reduce shipping and freight costs").
49. Id. at 842 (stating that plant relocation that results in termination may affect the
"tenure" of employment, but tenure is not the same thing as a "term or condition of
employment").
50. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
51. Dorsey Trailers,Inc., 233 F.3d at 842.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
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in either Fibreboardand/or First National to determine if the decision to
A more
relocate was a term and condition of employment.
Food &
comprehensive look into the decision to relocate came in United
53
Commercial Workers Int'l Union v. Dubuque Packing Co.
The D.C. Circuit in Dubuque Packing upheld the NLRB's new
standard of evaluating possible violations of § 158(d) as they pertain to
relocation decisions.54 The new standard created by the NLRB involved
the various elements
a three-part test, which was engineered using
5
looked at by the courts in the previous cases.
The first part of the test is based upon Justice Stewart's concurring
56 The Board's test exempts from the duty to
opinion in Fibreboard.
bargain relocation decisions that involve:
(1) a basic change in the nature of the employer's operation, (2) a
change in the scope and direction of the enterprise, (3) situations in
which the work performed at the new location varies significantly
from the work performed at the former plant, or (4) situations in
is to be discontinued
which the work performed at the former plant
57
entirely and not moved to the new location.
This part of the test stresses the need to have a different type of business
being conducted at the new plant location than what had previously been
performed at the old plant.
The second part of the NLRB's test looks at the "motivation for the
relocation decision., 58 The Board is particularly interested in whether or
not the employer's decision to relocate was based on labor costs (direct
and/or indirect).59 If the decision to relocate is motivated by labor costs,
then the employer has a duty to bargain in good faith prior to relocating.
This part of the test is very similar to the analysis that was done by the
53. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union v. Dubuque Packing Co., I
F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The NLRB incorporated the logic used in Fibreboard,First
National, and Otis Elevator Co. in creating a new standard to evaluate if a term and
condition of employment has been violated by an employer who failed to bargain over a
relocation decision. See id.
54. Id. at 25 ("We hold that the new standard adopted by the Board for evaluating
such claims is an acceptable reading of the National Labor Relations Act and Supreme
Court precedents.").
55. Id.at 30 (The three-part test was used by the NLRB to determine if Dubuque
Packing Company committed unfair labor practices by failing to bargain with the union
over the relocation of its "hog kill and cut" operations).
56. Id.("First, the test recognizes a category of decisions lying 'at the core of
entrepreneurial control,' in which employers may unilaterally take action.") (citing
FibreboardPaperProducts Corp., 379 U.S. at 223).
57. Id.
58. Id.(This part of the "Board's analysis is a subjective one").
59. Id.(This part of the Board's analysis "will distinguish relocations motivated by
labor costs from those motivated by other perceived advantages of the new location").
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Board in Otis Elevator Co.
The third part of the test includes a futility provision. 6' In this part
of the test, "the Board permits an employer to relocate without
negotiating where its union either would not or could not offer sufficient
concessions to change its decision., 62 The Board used an illustration to
show a situation in which negotiations with the union would not have
changed the relocation decision by the employer: a case in which "[an
employer] would not remain at the present plant because ... the costs for
modernization of equipment or environmental controls were greater than
[the value of] any labor cost concessions the union could offer., 6 3 This
part of the test uses logic similar to that of the Supreme Court in First
National.64 In First National, the Court held that an employer did not
have a duty to bargain with the union before shutting down a part of the
business because the union had no control or authority over the fee that
the employer was willing to pay to continue running that portion of the
65
business.
The Supreme Court, circuit courts, and the NLRB use various ways
to look at the issue of an employer's duty to bargain with the union under
29 U.S.C § 158(d). We will now look at how these decisions apply to a
MLB owner's decision to close and/or relocate a MLB team.
V.

Laws of Bargaining as They Apply to Contracting and/or
Relocating MLB Teams

A. Contraction

When applying the precedent caselaw to the possibility of
contraction in MLB, it appears that an owner would be able to contract a
team at will. By shutting down a baseball team, an owner would be
closing down the entire business.6 6 The owner would also be making a
60. See Otis Elevator Co., 1984 NLRB LEXIS 866, at *1 (1984). In both cases the
NLRB looked at whether the employer's decision to relocate was based upon the direct
and/or indirect costs of labor. See id.
61. Dubuque Packing Co., 1 F.3d at 24.
62. Id. ("Also, the Board has pledged to consider circumstances such as the need to
implement a relocation 'expeditiously' in determining whether bargaining over a
relocation has reached 'a bona fide impasse,' that is, the point at which a party may act
unilaterally.").
63. Id. at 31.
64. See First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
65. Id. (The employer had no duty to bargain because the union had no control or
authority over the fee that the employer was willing to pay to continue housekeeping
services at the nursing home).
66. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965)
(Under the holding in Darlington, a MLB team owner should be able to contract a team
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decision that "fundamentally alter[s] the direction of an enterprise,"
involving "major shifts in the capital investment or corporate strategy of
a company." 67 Therefore, if a MLB team owner is merely contracting a
team, he should not have a duty to bargain with the MLBPA.
B. Relocation
The issue of relocation is not as clear-cut as the issue of contraction.
All precedent concerning the shutting down of a business, or contraction,
establishes that employers are under no duty to bargain with a union
prior to closing their entire business. 68 The caselaw on the issue of
relocation is not nearly as clear. As discussed earlier, courts have looked
at the duty of an employer to bargain with the union prior to relocating a
business in several different ways. 69 How do these different holdings
apply to the decision of a MLB owner who wishes to relocate a baseball
team?
When evaluating the issue of whether a MLB owner has a duty to
bargain with the MLBPA before relocating a team, one must first look to
When applying
the Supreme Court precedents on the matter.7 °
Fibreboardto the decision a MLB owner would face, one question is
whether the decision to relocate turns on the issue of labor costs. 7 1 If a
MLB owner is considering a move, the decision to relocate inevitably
will turn on the issue of labor costs. MLB owners will decide to relocate
if their costs compared to their revenues are causing the business to be
unprofitable. Because the cost of MLB player's salaries (labor costs) are
the major expense of the team, the decisions would be influenced by this
factor.
The other issue raised in Fibreboardwas the question whether or
not the decision to subcontract work would "alter the Company's basic
operation." 72 Similar to Fibreboard,if a MLB owner decided to relocate
without having to bargain with the MLBPA because he would be closing an "entire
business").
67. See FibreboardPaperProd.Corp., 379 U.S. at 209-10.
68. See Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. at 263; FibreboardPaper Prod. Corp., 379
U.S. at 203.
69. See First Nat'l, 452 U.S. at 666; Fibreboard,379 U.S. at 203; Dubuque Packing
Co., 1 F.3d at 24; Otis Elevator Co., 1984 NLRB LEXIS 866, at *1 (1984).
70. See First Nat'l, 452 U.S. at 666; Fibreboard,379 U.S. at 203. These two
Supreme Court cases, though not dealing with a relocation decision, are looked at as
precedent in evaluating an employer's decision to relocate a business.
71. Fibreboard,379 U.S. at 213.
72. Id. The decision to subcontract work "did not alter the Company's basic
operation. The maintenance work still had to be performed at the plant. No capital
investment was contemplated; the Company merely replaced existing employees with
those of an independent contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of
employment." Id.In the case of a MLB owner relocating a team, he too would continue
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a team there would not be a change in "the Company's basic
operation. 73 The difference, however, lies in the fact that in Fibreboard
the employees lost their jobs, while the MLB owners would keep the
same players when they relocated. Even though the decision to relocate
has much to do with labor costs, and relocating would not "alter the
Company's basic operation," the decision would not cause any player to
lose his job.74 For this reason, the MLB owners should not feel
compelled to bargain with the MLBPA over a relocation decision for fear
75
of violating the rule set forth in Fibreboard.
When looking at the same situation applied to the First National
decision, the same result occurs, but through different logic and
application.76 The Court in First National allowed for unilateral
decisions by employers in instances where the burden placed on the
business outweighs the benefit for labor-management relations and the
collective bargaining process." In the situation of a MLB owner, the
burden placed on the owner is low revenues. These low revenues are
caused by low ticket sales and inadequate television contracts, in
conjunction with increased salaries and other expenses. If this loss in
revenues is great enough, it might outweigh the benefit for labormanagement relations and the collective bargaining process.7 8 This,
however, would have to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
The Court in First National also stated that an employer can
unilaterally implement decisions in instances where the union has no
control or authority to change the employer's decision even if bargaining
were to take place.79 When looking at this rule in terms of a MLB owner
relocating a team, one must see whether or not the MLBPA has the
authority to, or can, control some aspect of the employer's decision. 8° As
previously stated, a MLB owner's decision to relocate will hinge on
whether the team is taking in enough revenue compared to the amount of
its expenses. The MLBPA has no control or authority over the amount
of ticket sales and other revenue coming in to the business. The MLBPA
does, however, have control over negotiating the salaries of the players
(labor costs) with the owners. Because the MLBPA has control over a
"the same work under similar conditions of employment" because the baseball team
would continue to operate, just in a different city. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. See First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
77. Id.at 686.
78. See id. (the decision by the housekeeping service to stop providing services to a
nursing home was due to a loss of money on the contract).
79. Id.
80. See id.
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part of the owner's decision to relocate, it looks like the owner would
have to bargain with the MLBPA before doing so. 81
This is not necessarily true. A MLB owner's decision to relocate
will not be made because of the salaries of the players. The MLB
owners will not ask players to take pay cuts due to low revenues, nor will
the MLBPA agree to lower players' salaries. The owner's decision to
relocate will be based solely on the reason that the team is suffering from
low revenues: the team's location in an unprofitable area. The owner's
desire to move stems from the belief that another city will be more
profitable for the organization, and the MLBPA has no control or
authority over this aspect of the decision. Therefore, under First
National a MLB owner should not have a duty to bargain with the
MLBPA before relocating a team.
The next step is to look at the decision to relocate a baseball team in
regard to cases that dealt specifically with relocations. The NLRB in
Otis Elevator Co., and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Dorsey
Trailers, looked at the decision to relocate in terms of how the decision
impacted the employees.82 The NLRB in Otis Elevator Co. asked
whether or not the decision to relocate turned on the issue of labor
costs. 83 The Fourth Circuit held that a decision to relocate can influence
mean the same
the "tenure" of employment, but that does not necessarily
84
employment.,
of
condition
or
"term
a
affecting
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thing
After applying the holdings in Otis Elevator Co. and Dorsey
Trailers to a MLB owner who wants to relocate a team, the MLB owner
should not feel obligated to bargain with the MLBPA before making the
decision to relocate. Similar to Otis Elevator Co., the decision of a MLB
85
owner to relocate a team would not "turn" on the issue of labor costs.
The decision to relocate in Otis Elevator Co. was made due to the
outdated technology at the research and development facility, while the
81. See id. (the union had no control or authority to negotiate the fee that the
employer was willing to receive for continuing service at the nursing home). In the
decision to relocate a MLB team, it seems like the authority of the MLBPA to negotiate
salaries should be enough to require the owners to bargain with them before relocating.
82. Otis Elevator Co., 1984 NLRB LEXIS 866, at *1 (1984); see Dorsey Trailers,
Inc. v. NLRB, 233 F.3d 831 (4th Cir. 2000).
83. Otis Elevator Co., 1984 NLRB LEXIS, at *8 (NLRB held that the labor costs
"may have been one of the factors which stimulated the evaluation process which
generated the decision," but the decision "turned" on the fact that the research and
development facility had outdated technology).
84. Dorsey Trailers, 233 F.3d at 842 (The decision to relocate was due to the more
effective assembly line structure and the geographical location of the new facility. The
court held that the decision to relocate was "fundamental to the basic direction of a
corporate enterprise" and that even though jobs were terminated at the facility this only
influenced the "tenure of employment").
85. See Otis Elevator Co., 1984 NLRB LEXIS, at *8.
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decision to relocate86 a MLB team would be made due to the stale market
in the current city.
The Fourth Circuit would likely view the decision to relocate a
baseball team in a similar way as it did in Dorsey Trailers. As in Dorsey
Trailers, the decision of an owner to relocate a MLB team would
influence the "tenure" of employment but "not a term or condition of
employment." 87 The decision to relocate a MLB team would influence
the "tenure" of employment because the decision to relocate would cause
the players, coaches, and team to move to another city. 88 Once more,
however, the decision to relocate a MLB team would be based on the low
revenues in the current city and "not a term or condition of
employment." Thus, a MLB owner should 89not be required to bargain
with the MLBPA before deciding to relocate.
The last case that can be applied to a MLB owner's decision to
relocate is Dubuque Packing.9" Because Dubuque Packing uses the logic
found in the cases already discussed, there is no need to reapply the
Dubuque Packing test. 9' When applying a MLB owner's decision to
relocate a team to any of the cases on the topic, the outcome has
consistently been that the MLB owner should not be required to bargain
with the MLBPA before deciding to relocate a team.
VI.

Should There Be an Exception for MLB?

Precedent dictates that owners are not required to bargain in good
faith with the union before contracting 92 or relocating a team. 93 The
MLBPA feels that an exception to this rule should exist for MLB due to
the unique character of the organization.94 This would not be the first
time MLB would be given an exception to a law governing labor and
employment. In 1922, the Supreme Court granted MLB an exemption to
the antitrust laws, which still exists today.95 In addition to this
exemption, MLB is unique due to the profit and revenue sharing amongst
86. Id.
87. Dorsey Trailers, 233 F.3d at 842.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union v. Dubuque Packing Co., I
F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
91. Id. (The NLRB incorporated the logic used in Fibreboard,First National, and
Otis in creating a new standard to evaluate if a term and condition of employment has
been violated by an employer who failed to bargain over a relocation decision).
92. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
93. See First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Fibreboard Paper
Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); Dubuque Packing Co., 1 F.3d at 24; Otis
Elevator Co., 1984 NLRB LEXIS 866, at *1 (1984).
94. Telephone Interview with Doyle Pryor, supra note 13.
95. Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat'l League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
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the teams. 96 Because of these unique circumstances, MLBPA argues that
the owners should be required to bargain in good faith prior to
contracting or relocating a team.97
A.

MLB 's Antitrust Exemption

In 1922, the United States Supreme Court, in FederalBaseball Club
v. National League, was presented with the issue of whether federal
antitrust laws apply to MLB. 98 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme
Court determined that the federal antitrust laws do not apply to MLB. 99
The Court held that the business of baseball was not interstate commerce
because the movement of teams across state lines was merely
"incidental" to the business. 00 This distinction enabled baseball to be
left alone, allowing its reserve system to avoid antitrust laws during
crucial times of development.' 0 In 1953, the Supreme Court used a
narrow application of stare decisis
to determine that the federal antitrust
02
MLB.1
to
pertain
not
do
still
laws
For the third time in fifty years, the Supreme Court reviewed federal
antitrust laws as they relate to MLB in Flood v. Kuhn.10 3 Again the
Supreme Court ruled that the federal antitrust laws do not apply to
MLB.10 4 In Flood, the Court held that MLB is a business engaged in
interstate commerce, but that0 5 baseball is an "exception and an anomaly"
to the federal antitrust laws.'
This exemption is not evident in any other sport; it is something that
is unique to the sport of baseball. This distinction between baseball and
other professional sports has been described as being "unrealistic,"
"inconsistent," and "illogical,"' 1 6 yet the exemption is still prevalent.
96. Pappas, supra note 6.
97. Telephone Interview with Doyle Pryor, supra note 13.
98. See Fed. Baseball Club, 259 U.S. at 200.
99. Id.at 208-09.
100. Id. This decision was, and is, highly criticized because there should be no
question that MLB is interstate commerce. MLB has teams traveling from state to state
to play games. The proceeds of the ticket sales of the games go toward paying the
salaries of the players, coaches, and owners. There are also vendors at the games who
sell commodities that have ties to interstate commerce. This is not "incidental to the
business." The Court should not have decided that MLB is not interstate commerce in
order to support its decision to grant MLB an exemption to the federal antitrust laws.
101. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 274 (1972). If it were not for the antitrust
exemption for MLB, there would have been a strong likelihood that MLB would have
failed. This is the main reason why critics believe that there is an antitrust exemption
unique to baseball. See id.
102. See id
103. Id.at 258.
104. Id.
105. ld.at 282.
106. See Salerno v. Am. League, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970).

2004]

CONTRACTION IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

The Court in Flood recognized the fact that the courts have been
reluctant to overrule FederalBaseball, and Congress has done nothing to
change legislation to eliminate the antitrust exemption. 0 7 For these
reasons, the Supreme Court in Flood concluded that any change to
MLB's antitrust exemption must come by way of the legislature and not
by the courts.
B. Profit and Revenue Sharing in M§LB
The revenue-sharing formula implemented for the 2001 MLB
season required each club to pay "20% of its local receipts, net of
stadium expenses, into a common pool.'

08

Three-quarters of this money

was divided equally among all thirty MLB teams and the remaining 25%
was shared by the clubs with the below-average local revenue, with the
lowest revenue teams receiving the most. 0 9 Revenue and profit sharing
is intended to help give small-market teams a chance to compete with the
big-markets clubs." 0
The flaw with revenue and profit sharing is that the owners of teams
are not required to use this money to help bolster their teams.' 1 ' Instead,
some small market owners pocket this money in order to turn a profit. 12
This is one of the reasons why the Minnesota Twins were the subject of
contraction." 3 "[I]n 2000, the Minnesota Twins received $21 million
from the revenue-sharing pool, $5 million more than the salaries paid to
their entire 25-man roster."' "14 That year, the Twins managed to turn a
profit, causing other MLB owners to realize that it would be cheaper to
contract the Twins than "to continue subsidizing their parasitic
billionaire owner."' " 15
B. No BargainingExceptionfor MiLB
Under 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) and the authoritative caselaw, an owner
should not have a duty to bargain with the MLBPA before contracting or
relocating a team. The reason why the Montreal Expos and the
Minnesota Twins were almost contracted was that the two teams failed to
bring in enough revenue to cover their expenses. The Expos and Twins
were being kept afloat by the profit and revenue shares provided by the
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Flood,407 U.S. at 272.
Pappas, supra note 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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other MLB teams. In the case of the Twins, this subsidy that should have
been used to
strengthen the team instead went toward making the owners
11 6
profitable.
If the owners decide to contract and/or relocate a team, like the
MLB owner's contemplated with the Expos and Twins, they should be
able to do so without having to bargain with the MLBPA. The fact that
MLB happens to be exempt from antitrust law and is treated differently
from other businesses is not an excuse to change the rules of
bargaining.1 1 7 The antitrust exemption was granted to keep the "National
Pastime" alive during times of financial difficulty. There is no reason
now for the courts, or an arbitrator, to change the rules of bargaining for
MLB.
MLBPA's other argument that owners should bargain in good faith
before contraction due to the profit and revenue sharing implications is
also weak. True, all thirty teams contribute to the "pool" of money that
is divided among the baseball clubs, but if a team is in financial disarray
then those teams will receive the majority of the money from the
remaining 25% of the proceeds." 8 By contracting struggling teams, the
pool of revenue can be concentrated on teams that need a little extra help
instead of keeping the least profitable teams afloat." 9 The profit and
revenue sharing amongst the MLB teams is not a valid reason for
changing the traditional rules of bargaining.
VII. Conclusion
In the future, if an arbitrator is faced with the issue of whether or
not a MLB owner has a duty to bargain with the MLBPA before
contracting and/or relocating a team, the arbitrator should conclude that
the MLB owner has no such duty.
If MLB owners decide to contract a team, it should be the right of
the owner to shut down operations without having to bargain with the
MLBPA before doing so.

120

If the owners decide to relocate a MLB

team, they should not have to bargain with the MLBPA because the
decision to relocate would not turn on the issue of labor costs.' 2'

The

decision of an owner to relocate a MLB team would stem from the

116.
117.

See id.
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).

118.

Pappas, supra note 6.

119. See id.
120. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
121. See Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); United Food
& Commercial Workers Int'l Union v. Dubuque Packing Co., 1 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1993);
Otis Elevator Co., 1984 NLRB LEXIS 866, at *1 (1984); see also Dorsey Trailers, Inc. v.
NLRB, 233 F.3d 831 (4th Cir. 2000).
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inadequate revenue being produced in the current city. If a MLB team is
located in an unprofitable area, the decision to relocate the team will not
change, no matter how much the owners and the MLBPA bargain and
negotiate. 122

The fact that MLB is unique when compared to other business
entities is not a reason to make an exception to the rules of bargaining for
MLB. It should not matter that the courts have given an antitrust
exemption to MLB, nor should it matter that there is revenue sharing
amongst the clubs. These distinct characteristics in MLB should not
change the well-established rules of bargaining and their application to
MLB owners and the MLBPA.

122. See First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Dubuque Packing
Co., I F.3d at 24.

